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a borrowing limit—and find that when the model
must match the observed distribution of the
growth rate of the output of individual firms,
the contribution of market imperfections to TFP
is rather small.
In “Middlemen in Limit-Order Markets,”
Jovanovic and Menkveld analyze the role of
middlemen in asset markets who are assumed to
have superior information and, hence, potentially
improve the allocation of resources as they can
“direct” each asset to its best use. They find that,
depending on the distribution of information of
potential asset traders, the presence of middle-
men can either increase or decrease efficiency.
They also confront the model with data that are
consistent with the introduction of middlemen
but their results are ambiguous. The last paper
that most directly discusses the role of financial
frictions is “Financial Markets and Unemploy  -
ment,” by Monacelli, Quadrini, and Trigari. They
study a situation in which firms and workers bar-
gain for wages but the total surplus—the object
to be divided—decreases in relation to the amount
of debt carried by the firm. They show that, in
T
he Thirty-Fifth Annual Economic Policy
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis was held October 21-22,
2010. The papers presented at the con-
ference covered a variety of approaches and
topics within the general theme of frictions in
financial and labor markets. One group of papers
directly addresses the question of the impact of
frictions in financial markets—defined as a depar-
ture from the complete market, perfectly competi-
tive Arrow-Debreu equilibrium—on economic
performance. In “Quantifying the Impact of
Financial Development on Economic Develop  -
ment,” Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang study
the impact of increases in the relative (to the rest
of the economy) efficiency of financial interme-
diaries in output and total factor productivity
(TFP). For a calibrated version of their model
they conclude that financial frictions can account
for large changes in output and measured TFP.
A somewhat different conclusion is reached by
Midrigan and Xu in “Finance and Misallocation:
Evidence from Plant-Level Data.” In that paper,
the authors study a different financial friction—
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will choose to borrow more since this lowers
their current surplus and thus the wage demands
of their workers.
A second set of papers looks at the role of
search frictions in labor and goods markets. In
“Joint-Search Theory: New Opportunities and
New Frictions,” Guler, Guvenen, and Violante
consider the employment-search problem of a
couple. They show that, in the absence of a market
that permits perfect risk-sharing, location deci-
sions and employment decisions are related and,
due to the costs of separation from one’s partner,
some workers would reject job offers that appear
to be above their reservation wage. A similar
idea—searching for a price in this case—drives
the price dispersion results in “Equilibrium Price
Dispersion and Rigidity: A New Monetarist
Approach,” by Head, Liu, Menzio, and Wright.
They show that when individuals differ in their
ability to search for the lowest price, (i) the opti-
mal pricing policy of a firm involves periods of
price stickiness (when average prices are chang-
ing) and (ii) price dispersion may occur in equi-
librium even when there is no inflation.
Finally, two papers deal with the effect of
frictions on income distribution. In “Inter  genera  -
tional Redistribution in the Great Recession,”
Glover, Heathcote, Krueger, and Ríos-Rull study
how a recession—not unlike the recent one in
the United States—influences the welfare of dif-
ferent generations. They show that (i) asset prices
will likely fall more than warranted by fundamen-
tals and (ii) this has a negative effect on relatively
older households. At the other end of the spec-
trum, younger households see their labor income
drop but are able to purchase some assets (from
the older generations) at bargain prices. Their
welfare does not decrease as much as that of the
older cohorts and, in some cases, it may increase.
In “Social Security, Benefit Claiming, and Labor
Force Participation: A Quan  titative General
Equilibrium Approach,” I
.
mrohorog ˘lu and Kitao
consider the quantitative implications of three
alternative Social Security reforms: reductions
in benefits, increases in normal retirement age,
and increases in the earliest retirement age. They
find that these proposals will have long-run posi-
tive effects. Even though this is not the focus of
their paper, it seems that such changes could
hurt current retirees and individuals close to
retirement.
Overall, the research at the conference suc-
ceeded in focusing attention of academic econo-
mists and policymakers alike on the role of
frictions in the economy.
INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS
In the following sections we briefly describe
the essential elements of the individual confer-
ence papers. The aim is not to provide a complete
description of the environment and results, but
rather to convey the major methodological and
factual contributions of the research. In some
cases, our analysis goes beyond the conference
version of the paper and tries to draw inferences
relevant for policymakers.
QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
How do changes in the productivity of the
financial intermediary sector affect the level 
of output? This is the question studied by
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang. In their model,
financial intermediaries exist because they better
detect misreporting by firms.
The main theoretical finding is that increases
in the efficiency of financial intermediaries (rela-
tive to the rest of the economy) increase output
through two channels. First, the set of firms that
receive funding shrinks and includes more high-
productivity firms. Second, the size of the loan
that each firm receives—which in all cases falls
short of the perfect information level—increases
for the most-productive firms and decreases for
the least-productive.
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang calibrate
their model to match the relevant data for the
United States and use it to predict the impact
on a given country’s output level if it adopted
Luxembourg’s financial system. The basic model
does an excellent job matching the cross-country
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ble with efficiency-increasing developments in
the financial intermediary sector.
The Model
The production function of a firm is given by 
where x is an aggregate productivity shock (com-
mon to all firms), ʸ (which can take two values
ʸ1 < ʸ2) is a firm-specific shock, and k and ￿ are,
respectively, capital and labor. The key assump-
tion is that although the type of firm is public
knowledge (i.e., the set τ = ￿ʸ1,ʸ2￿ is known), the
particular realization of ʸ is not.
Since firms need to borrow funds to purchase
capital, they contract with a financial interme-
diary. The distinguishing feature of this interme-
diary is its access to a monitoring technology.
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang describe the
properties of this monitoring technology in terms
of the probability of detecting a cheater—a firm
that claims to have received a low-productivity
draw, ʸ1, when in fact it enjoys high productivity,
ʸ2—as a function 
where Pij￿￿mj,k,z￿ is the probability of detecting
fraud when a firm announces that its productivity
is ʸj when in fact it is ʸi. This probability increases
the number of workers assigned to monitoring,
￿mj, as well as the productivity of the financial
sector, z. It decreases with the size of the loan,
capturing the idea that larger (and more complex)
loans are more difficult to monitor.
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang analyze the
optimal contract between financial intermediaries
and firms. They find that
(i) the set of projects that is financed—that
is, the set of τ = ￿ʸ1,ʸ2￿ that gets loans—
shrinks as the relative efficiency of the
financial sector increases (i.e., as z/x
increases). Moreover, this “shrinkage” is
associated with increases in the average
efficiency of the funded firms;
(ii) as the efficiency of the financial interme-
diaries increase, some low-return firms
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fail to obtain funding, while high-return
firms receive larger loans. This increases
output and measured TFP; and
(iii) increases in financial intermediary effi-
ciency result in higher wages.
Quantitative Results
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang consider
alternative measures of intermediation costs
(interest rate spreads, the capital-to-output ratio,
or overhead costs) and calibrate the model using
U.S. data on firm size distribution and output
per worker. Then they use the model to ask some
counterfactual questions about the United States—
a mature economy in which increases in pro-
ductivity in finance match overall increases in
productivity—and Taiwan—a developing coun-
try that has experienced a significant increase in
the relative productivity of its financial sector.
They find that
(i) in the United States, about 30 percent of
the growth in output per capita in the
1974-2004 period (from $22,352 to
$41,208) can be attributed to productivity
improvements in the financial sector, z.
Stated differently, had the level of produc-
tivity of financial intermediaries remained
at its 1974 level, output per capita would
have grown from $22,352 to $33,656. The
difference is accounted for by the banking
sector; and
(ii) in Taiwan, over the same period about 50
percent of the increase in output was due
to improvements in z.
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang also use the
model to understand the contribution of changes
in the efficiency of finance on the cross-sectional
distribution of output levels. To this end, they
assume that the model holds; in addition, with
data on interest rate spreads and output per capita,
they estimate, for each country j, the levels of
aggregate productivity, xj, and financial sector
productivity, zj, that are consistent with the evi-
dence. Since there is no obvious real-world ana-
log of the parameter z, they regress the value of
zj for country j on a measure of financial develop-
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tic product [GDP]) and find that the correlation
is high. This suggests that their identification
procedure captures actual changes in efficiency.
With a parameterized model for a sample of
over 40 countries, they find that the United States
has the highest level of productivity outside the
financial sector (i.e., the highest level of xj), while
Luxembourg has the highest level of financial
sector efficiency (highest level of zj). Then they
ask the following question: “By how much would
the output per capita in country j increase if
instead of its own (estimated) value of the effi-
ciency of the financial sector, zj, it had the level
of financial efficiency enjoyed by Luxembourg?”
Their findings include the following:
(i) World output would rise by 65 percent
by moving all countries to the best finan-
cial practices.
(ii) Dispersion in cross-country output would
fall by about 19 percentage points, from
77 percent to 58 percent.
(iii) Measured increases in world TFP would
exceed 17 percent.
(iv) The countries that would benefit the most
from this switch would see increases in
output per capita of over 130 percent.
Turkey, Uganda, Brazil, and Nigeria are
in this category.
(v) The countries that would benefit the
least would still experience significant
increases in output that exceed 10 per-
cent. This group includes New Zealand,
Finland, Austria, and Ireland.
(vi) With no technological change in the
financial sector, U.S. GDP would have
grown at an annual rate of 1.4 percent
instead of the observed 2.0 percent rate.
A careful analysis of the robustness of these
results to alternative measures of intermediation
costs is provided in the paper.
The paper also identifies the mechanism
through which changes in the efficiency of the
financial sector affect output. Greenwood,
Sanchez, and Wang define the degree of distor-
tion as the average value of the excess expected
return over the cost of capital. High values of
this indicator are associated with low investment
and a source of inefficiency that has the flavor
of “money left on the table”: Some projects with
high expected returns are not financed (and hence
never implemented). Their findings include the
following:
(i) The average distortion level ranges from
a high of 49.8 percent (Uganda) to a low
of 4.6 percent (Luxembourg).
(ii) The coefficient of variation across plants
in a country can be high; it ranges from
32.7 percent (Uganda) to 1.94 percent
(Luxembourg). This dispersion corre-
sponds to differences across firms in the
shadow price of capital, which implies
that, relative to the first best, the country
is in the interior of its production possi-
bilities frontier.
(iii) The average (world) distortion level is
23.4 percent, with an average coefficient
of variation of 14.6 percent. If all coun-
tries adopted Luxembourg’s financial
efficiency, the mean distortion drops to
2.6 percent and the average standard
deviation to 1.1 percent, a very signifi-
cant decrease.
The authors discuss alternative identification
strategies, including the role of internal finance
and robustness checks for the specification of the
production function (constant elasticity of substi-
tution instead of Cobb-Douglas), as well as unmea-
sured investment in intangible capital. They find
that, in all cases, the differences in productivity
of the financial intermediary sector account for
a significant fraction of the differences in output
per capita. Moreover, policies that result in
increases in that productivity relative to overall
productivity can have large effects on output.
Conclusion
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang find that
finance matters for productivity and that changes
in the efficiency of monitoring—a key function
of financial intermediaries—can have a large
impact on output. For policymakers the model
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in some sense, result in lower levels of efficiency
in the financial sector, as well as the benefits





Midrigan and Xu study the theoretical and
quantitative effects of capital market imperfections
on measured aggregate TFP. The imperfections
take the form of a borrowing limit that depends
on a firm’s asset position. The model is rich
enough to match a large number of moments of
the distribution of the output growth rate of indi-
vidual firms; the major finding is that financial
repression does not have a large impact on meas-
ured TFP.
No Entry and No Exit
Midrigan and Xu study two different versions
of their basic economy. In the first, all individuals
must operate a technology (i.e., they are entre-
preneurs) and there is a fixed supply of labor. In
the second model, individuals can choose to be
either entrepreneurs or workers, depending on
their managerial skills.
The problem faced by an entrepreneur who
chooses investment, savings, and consumption
to maximize expected utility is 
subject to 
The first constraint is simply the production
function, and Ait is the specific technology shock
that follows some exogenous stochastic process.
The second constraint is the financing constraint.
It says that the expenditure on inputs—labor
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a multiple ʻ of previous-period saving, Bit. In
this formulation, ʻ = 1 corresponds to no borrow-
ing: All expenditures must be financed using
previous saving, while ʻ = ￿ captures perfect
capital markets.
The optimal decision rules in this economy
are 
where 
where ﾵit is the shadow value (Lagrange multi-
plier) of the financing constraint. Thus, in this
model, the financing constraint effectively implies
that different firms face different effective prices
for inputs and, hence, that the economy must be
in the interior of the production possibilities set.
Improvements in the environment that decrease
the financing constraint (i.e., that lower the
Lagrange multiplier, ﾵit) reduce the cross-sectional
dispersion of input prices and, in principle, will
bring the economy closer to the frontier.
Midrigan and Xu argue that the key driver of
inefficiency in this setting is the standard devia-
tion of the specific productivity shock, Ait. The
larger the variability, the greater the need of exter-
nal sources to finance expansion and, hence, the
more important any frictions in financial markets
become.
Quantitative Results
Midrigan and Xu use data from a large dataset
of firms in Korea and Colombia to estimate the
parameters of the model. The key stochastic
process is the individual productivity level, Ait.
They require that the estimated process be such
that the model’s predictions for the distribution
of growth rates of individual firms match the data.
Their major finding is that if they force the model
to account for the skewness of growth rates, indi-
vidual productivity processes do not vary much.
This, in turn, implies that the cost of financial
imperfections is not very large. To see this, con-
sider the extreme case of a constant level of Ait.
In this scenario, perhaps after some initial period,
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the optimal level of inputs and, hence, financial
repression cannot have any lasting effects.
Given the estimated process for individual
productivity, Midrigan and Xu pick the parame-
ter ʻ to match the debt-to-GDP ratio for Korea,
Colombia, and a country such as the United
States. They find that financial restrictions cannot
account for the large estimated differences in TFP.
To be precise, they estimate that U.S. TFP is 1.3
percent lower than it would have been without
frictions, while in Korea—which has a relatively
developed financial system—the loss is 3.6 per-
cent, and in Colombia—which has more restric-
tions on financial intermediation—the loss is 5.2
percent. Since standard estimates imply that the
TFP gap between poor countries and the United
States is about 60 percent, the model implies that
imperfect capital markets explain only 4 percent
of that 60 percent.
Entry and Exit
In a second version of the basic model,
Midrigan and Xu allow for entry and exit. They
assume that there is some exogenous “death rate”
(and a similar birth rate) and that individuals
can choose, in every period, whether to be an
entrepreneur or a worker. Thus, the one-period
profit of an entrepreneur is 
subject to 
The individual-agent problem is then 
subject to 
where the last term indicates that the individual
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As Midrigan and Xu note, when new potential
entrepreneurs are born it is important to deter-
mine the correlation, if any, between their entre-
preneurial skills, Ait, and their endowment of
saving, Bit. In the quantitative exercise, the authors
consider two possible relationships between
these two variables.
In this environment, financial frictions can
affect productivity along two margins. First, as
in the model with no entry and no exit, capital
market imperfections imply that each firm faces
a potentially different shadow price of capital,
which creates inefficiencies. Second, the same
imperfections can influence the “identity” of
the individuals who become entrepreneurs. The
potential cost includes both low-productivity
individuals who eventually manage a firm and
high-productivity individuals who, for lack of
access to credit markets, choose to become workers.
Quantitative Results
Midrigan and Xu initially assume that indi-
viduals are born with no wealth. Thus, a poten-
tially new entrepreneur has Bit = 0 at birth. As
before, the authors choose the stochastic process
for productivity to match the distribution of
growth rates and find that the losses associated
with financial constraints are much larger than
in the previous case. For the United States the
loss increases from 1.3 percent to 4.4 percent, for
Korea from 3.6 percent to 10.6 percent, and for
Colombia from 5.2 percent to 13.1 percent. Even
though these estimates fall short of explaining
the bulk of estimated differences, they suggest
that capital market imperfections can have a sig-
nificant impact on output. Interestingly, almost
all the losses correspond to misallocation of inputs
across firms and very few to misallocation of
entrants into entrepreneurship.
One source of inefficiency in this case is the
binding constraint on new high-productivity
firms. In the absence of financing constraints,
these firms would be “born large.” However, the
lack of access to credit prevents them from reach-
ing a high scale initially. This loss of potential
output reduces measured TFP. However, the
counterpart of this scenario is that these produc-
tive but “asset-poor” firms grow very rapidly:
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tive, they grow fast. When Bit = 0, the model
grossly overpredicts the growth rate of young
firms and, hence, this is not a good identification
assumption.
As an alternative, Midrigan and Xu assume
that initial wealth is positively related to the
potential demand for inputs. They justify this
assumption as a proxy for the existence of venture
capitalists who can obtain a signal about Ait and
provide start-up funds to the entrepreneur. They
choose the correlation to match the growth rate
of small firms. With this new parameterization
they find that the loss of TFP is very similar to
that of the model with no entry and no exit.
Conclusion
In a dynamic model of entrepreneurship with
the requirement that the endogenous distribution
of the growth rates of individual firms’ output
and the aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio must match
the data, the major finding is that capital market
imperfections can explain only a small fraction
of the measured differences in TFP between rich
and financially developed economies and poor—
and typically financially constrained—economies.
MIDDLEMEN IN LIMIT-ORDER
MARKETS
Jovanovic and Menkveld study the allocative
efficiency implications of financial intermedi-
aries. They develop a series of theoretical models
that are useful in understanding the role of a spe-
cial type of financial intermediary: middlemen.
They model middlemen as reducing frictions
since they have access to better information than
buyers and sellers in asset markets. They show
that (i) the introduction of middlemen can either
improve or reduce welfare (efficiency) and (ii) the
outcome depends on the information structure.
When adverse selection is not important, middle-
men reduce efficiency, whereas in environments
in which asymmetric information about common
values creates selection problems, middlemen
can improve efficiency by revealing information.
The authors analyze the impact of a trading
system that they view as facilitating the intro-
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duction of middlemen. Their findings are mixed.
Consistent with their theory, middlemen reduce
bid-ask spreads but their introduction decreases
trading volume. The welfare consequences of
this experiment are ambiguous and more work
in this area is necessary.
The Model
Jovanovic and Menkveld study a classic
asset-allocation problem: One individual—the
buyer—with private valuation for the asset equal
to x + z can trade with another individual—the
seller—with private valuation given by y + z. In
this setting, x and y are independently drawn from
some distribution, denoted by F, and their values
are known only to the individual parties. On the
other hand, the common component z may or may
not be known to both buyers and sellers. In this
simple environment, first-best efficiency requires
that the asset be held by whoever has the higher
private valuation. Thus, if x > y the seller should
keep the asset, while if x ≤ y the asset should be
transferred to the buyer.
Jovanovic and Menkveld study a sequence of
environments that differ in terms of their informa-
tion structure. The simplest case is one in which
neither party knows the value of z and there are
no middlemen. Even in this case, the outcome
depends on the allocation of monopoly rights.
Consider the case in which the seller “comes
to the market first”; then the seller can post a bid
interpreted as the price at which he or she is will-
ing to sell the asset. Normalizing the expected
value of the common component equal to zero,
the seller’s payoff is 
The interpretation is simple: If the price p is
announced, the buyer will accept the bid only if
y ≥ p, which happens with probability 1 – F￿p￿.
Thus, in the case of a sale, the seller receives
p￿1 – F￿p￿￿. If the buyer’s valuation is below p—
an event with probability F￿p￿—the seller keeps
the asset and enjoys utility F￿p￿x.
Next let us look at the opposite case: The




p F p F p x = − () () + () max . 1at which he or she is willing to purchase the asset.
In this case, the seller’s payoff is 
What is the role of an intermediary—a middle-
man in financial jargon—in this market? One view,
noted by Jovanovic and Menkveld, is that high-
frequency trading programs have an information-
processing advantage over individuals. Thus,
one way to model this advantage is to assume
that the high-frequency middleman trader knows
the common value z. Since a middleman is just
an intermediary, the authors assume that he or
she has no private valuation for the good—that
is, if the middleman ends up with the asset, the
payoff is just z.
The authors study a competitive version in
which there is free entry into the middleman
market. This guarantees that middlemen make
zero profits in equilibrium. The middleman
makes a bid to the seller and then, when the buyer
arrives, posts an asking price. Even though the
buyer does not know the common component z,
it can be inferred from the middleman’s bid.
Jovanovic and Menkveld show that the asking
price (by the middleman) is 
where 
while the middleman’s bid to the seller is 
where 
Π
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Note that in the presence of middlemen both
buyers and sellers “learn” the actual value of the
common component z and that this property does
not depend on the particular properties of the
distribution of z.
It is natural to ask whether the presence of
middlemen improves the efficiency of financial
markets. To this end, the authors compute an
example (although the results are much more
general); the results (which can be further general-
ized) are summarized in Table 1.
In this version of the model, the presence of
middlemen unambiguously decreases welfare.
It is well known from the work of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) that no mechanism can attain
the first-best level of welfare. In this case, when
buyers and sellers are symmetrically informed
about the common component of the value of the
asset and there are no middlemen, the level of
welfare is about 94 percent of the first best. The
volume of trade is only half of what would be
observed in the first best and this reveals the
source of the inefficiency: There are instances
in which the buyer has a higher valuation for the
asset and the price announced by the seller is too
high and, hence, no trade takes place. Finally,
there is a significant spread (defined as the aver-
age of the prices posted by sellers and buyers) in
this case. Enter the middlemen (the last row of
Table 1). In this case, more trades are executed
(about 60 percent of the first-best volume) and
the spreads decrease (from 0.5 to 0.25); neverthe-
less, welfare is lower. Thus, the simple evidence
of more competition—more volume and lower
spreads—does not imply higher efficiency. The
reason is simple: In some cases, middlemen fail
to execute both sides of the trade and they end up
holding the asset. Since their valuation is lower
than either the buyer’s or the seller’s, this is a
source of welfare losses. In this environment, the
conclusion is unambiguous: Middlemen reduce
welfare.
What happens when buyers and sellers are
asymmetrically informed about z? In this case, it
is possible to show that, in the absence of middle-
men, the volume of trade converges to zero as
the variance of the common component grows
without bound. The intuition for this is the no-
Table 1
Summary Results
Regime No. of Trades Welfare Spread
First best TW 0
No middlemen 0.5 ￗ T 0.94 ￗ W 0.5
Middlemen 0.6 ￗ T 0.85 ￗ W 0.25trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982). If
the payoffs to buyers and sellers were to be renor-
malized by dividing by the standard deviation of
the common shock—an innocuous transformation
given risk neutrality—those payoffs would be as
follows:
Then as σ ₒ ￿, the valuations converge to z—
that is, the valuations are common to both
traders—and if the private information of the
buyers and sellers is just a signal of the true z,
the no-trade theorem implies that there will be
no trade in equilibrium.
Enter the middlemen again. In this case, the
middlemen act just as in the previous case.
Even if the traders initially were asymmetrically
informed, the bid and ask prices posted by the
middleman reveal the true value of z. This elimi-
nates the asymmetry of information about the
common component, which alleviates the adverse
selection problem. Thus, in this case the presence
of middlemen increases welfare.
Jovanovic and Menkveld go on to study
dynamic versions and discuss mechanism design
issues, but the message of their theoretical results
is fairly robust: Whether middlemen improve
economic efficiency depends on the traders’
information structure.
Empirical Analysis
The authors analyze the advent of middlemen
by exploiting the introduction of a high-frequency,
trading-friendly venue as an instrument. The
equity exchange Chi-X started trading Dutch index
stocks on April 16, 2007. Unlike the incumbent
exchange, Euronext, it did not charge traders for
limit orders (i.e., posted prices), modifications,
or executions; limit orders that led to execution
received a rebate. The authors use data from the
first 77 trading days of 2007 and 2008 to establish
the treatment effect. To control for time effects
they use Belgian index stocks as the untreated
sample since those stocks were trading on











They were able to identify a trader who nets
out trades between the two systems. This trader
has several of the characteristics of a middleman:
Trades are most active when there are changes
in an aggregate index of stock values, and his
trading position is zero about half the time even
though volume is typically high.
Jovanovic and Menkveld find that the entry
of middlemen (in this case, Chi-X) is accompanied
by an increase in liquidity supply and a drop in
volume. The bid-ask spread did not increase for
Dutch stocks but went up by 35 percent for
Belgian stocks. Thus, from the perspective of the
model the introduction of middlemen decreases
spreads by 35 percent. The number of trades was
unaffected by the entry of middlemen but volume
declined.
Conclusion
The paper shows that, theoretically, the
introduction of middlemen can have an ambigu-
ous impact on welfare. The authors find some
evidence of middlemen-like trading associated
with the introduction of a new trading system.
They find that spreads are lower after the middle-
men appear, which is consistent with their theory.
However, they also find that trading volume




Monacelli, Quadrini, and Trigari consider
whether changes to the availability of credit may
amplify unemployment fluctuations, relative to
a standard business cycle model with search and
matching.
The key transmission mechanism of the paper
works as follows: Higher debt reduces the period-
by-period surplus produced by a firm; workers
and firms bargain over this total surplus, and thus
higher debt allows firms to lower wages and labor
costs. This idea is motivated by results from the
empirical corporate finance literature. For instance,
Matsa (2010) tests the premise that collective
bargaining imposes a greater threat to a firm when
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ity. Firms thus have an incentive to use debt to
shield their liquidity from workers during bar-
gaining. He finds that union bargaining power
leads firms to increase financial leverage in a quan-
titatively significant way. Similarly, Bronars and
Deere (1991) find a positive correlation between
leverage and the degree of unionization (which
may affect the bargaining power of workers).
The mechanism linking financial frictions to
unemployment fluctuations considered by these
authors is fundamentally different from traditional
channels wherein credit facilitates investment or
provides additional resources to finance produc-
tion input costs. The quantitative analysis of this
paper suggests that the response of employment
and unemployment to credit shocks is, in fact,
statistically significant and of relevant magnitude.
Hence, financial frictions may indeed amplify
the impact of exogenous shocks on employment
and output.
The Model
The economy is constituted by risk-neutral
households, which can be either employed or
unemployed. While unemployed, households
can costlessly search for a job. Households save
in two types of assets: shares of firms and bonds.
Firms are created through the matching of a posted
vacancy and a worker. The number of matches is
determined by a standard matching function that
depends on the number of unemployed and
vacancies. Matches break with probability ʻ
every period. All firms are subject to a common
productivity shock, which varies exogenously
through time. Lending is done by competitive
intermediaries who pool a large number of loans.
At every period, the following events take place
(in sequential order): (i) wage bargaining, (ii)
financial decisions, and (iii) default.
Each firm employs one worker, and output is
thus equal to aggregate productivity, zt. Dividends
are output plus the net change in debt minus the
wage bill, namely, 
d z w b
b
R
t t t t
t = − − +
+1 ,
where R is the interest rate charged on debt. Firms
maximize the expected discounted value of divi-
dends. Firms know wages are determined by Nash
bargaining. More important, firms understand
that debt levels, bt, affect the outcome of the bar-
gaining process, and take this into account when
choosing their optimal debt levels. If wt = gt￿bt￿,
a firm’s problem can be summarized by 
The constraint of the firm’s problem is the limited
participation constraint. It states that the amount
of debt the firm can undertake cannot be larger
than a fraction of the value of the firm. The firm’s
credit limit is affected by an exogenous factor ˆt;
changes in its value are called credit shocks.
Observe that the additive nature of the firm’s
objective implies that new debt does not depend
on current wages or current debt. Therefore, all
firms will choose to carry forward the same level
of debt. This is analytically very convenient since
there is no need to keep track of the firm’s distri-
bution of debt holdings.
Since agents are risk neutral, the interest rate
is constant and given by r = 1/ʲ – 1. The interest
on corporate bonds takes into account that repay-
ment occurs with probability ʻ. As markets are
competitive, R￿1 – ʻ￿ = 1 + r.
Firms considering entry must pay a fixed
entry cost. Production starts one period after entry,
and thus no labor costs are incurred on entry. In
equilibrium, firms will enter the market until
the entry cost is equal to the value of posting a
vacancy.
An important feature of the model that sim-
plifies the bargaining problem is that the value
of participation for workers is not affected by
capital income. This can be done because the
impact of changes in the dividend of an individual
firm is negligible for an individual worker. Hence,
the current payoff of being employed is the wage.
The current payoff of being unemployed is an
exogenously given unemployment benefit, a.
The overall return for the household is 
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In turn, the value of being unemployed, given
that the probability of finding a job is pt, is recur-
sively defined by 
As is common in this type of bargaining prob-
lems, the wage is set so that the firm and the
household split the net surplus of the match,
Workers will thus capture a fraction ʷ of this
surplus.
Results
The main theoretical finding is that firms
choose to carry as much debt as the constraint
allows, as long as workers have strictly positive
bargaining power. The rationale is as follows: If
the firm increases its debt by one unit, it can pay
the present value of this amount in dividends
today; however, the effective cost of repayment
is lower than one. Repayment is made only with
probability 1 – ʻ, and, more importantly, a higher
level of debt reduces the part of the surplus that
eventually goes to the worker.
The response of the model to a positive pro-
ductivity shock zt is as follows: Higher productiv-
ity generates an employment expansion. Financial
frictions amplify the effects of this shock because
higher productivity also increases the value of
the firm—and thus the amount it can borrow—
and the debt it will undertake. Ultimately, higher
debt reduces the cost of labor, which motivates
firms to expand employment further.
The quantitative analysis starts by consider-
ing a somewhat standard parameterization of the
model. Impulse response analysis illustrates that
the amplification of employment fluctuations
ˆ H b w w E H b U t t t t t t t , , ( ) = + − ( ) ( )+     + + + β ʻ ʻ 1 1 1 1
H b g b E H b U t t t t t t t t ( ) = ( )+ − ( ) ( )+     + + + β ʻ ʻ 1 1 1 1 .
U a E p H B p U t t t t t t t = + ( )+ − ( )     + + + β 1 1 1 1 .
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that can be generated by this model is quantita-
tively relevant. Finally, a structural vector auto  -
regressive approach is used. The shocks are
identified using short-term restrictions derived
from the theoretical model. The impact of credit
shocks on employment is indeed statistically
significant. Moreover, productivity shocks lead
to credit expansions.
Conclusion
Monacelli and Trigari consider a new mecha-
nism that may amplify the effect of shocks on
unemployment and the business cycle. By incur-
ring debt, firms lower the surplus available for
bargaining with workers and thus lower labor
costs. Firms thus maximize their debt capacity
(limited by an endogenous constraint whereby
creditors can recover only an exogenous fraction
of the value of the firm). Productivity shocks, in
addition to their standard effects on income and
employment, change the value of the firm, and
thus its debt capacity and labor costs. This ampli-
fication mechanism may be of interest to policy-
makers as a potential factor to account for the
persistently high levels of unemployment in the




Guler, Guvenen, and Violante study the joint
job-search and location problem of a household
formed by a couple that perfectly pools income.
Previous models assume these decisions are made
by individuals acting in isolation. The framework
of analysis builds on the well-known single-agent
search models of McCall (1970) and Mortensen
(1970), in which the unemployed receive a wage
offer from an exogenous wage distribution every
period. Rejecting an offer means remaining unem-
ployed. Once an offer is accepted by an individual,
he or she will be employed at the corresponding
wage for the infinite future.
The key theoretical finding is that two-agent
households face new opportunities and new
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opportunities arise because one member of the
couple can get income immediately without sac-
rificing the choice of “searching” for a better job
(since the other member of the household may
continue to receive offers). Further, by switching
roles as better offers come along, a two-agent
household may manage to climb the wage ladder
even in the absence of an on-the-job search (per
individual). The new frictions stem from the fact
that job offers may come from different locations
and couples face an additional cost when they
do not live together. For certain model parameter-
izations, labor outcomes under joint job-search
and location decisions are quantitatively very
different from those of standard single-agent
models.
The Model
Individuals live forever and all participate in
the labor force. Time is continuous and there is
no aggregate uncertainty. Single individuals maxi-
mize the expected lifetime utility from consump-
tion. Everyone is entitled to certain consumption,
b, when unemployed and receives wage offers at
a constant rate, a, from a predetermined wage
distribution, F￿w￿. The discount factor is r. In the
standard single-agent case, the moment an offer
is accepted income is forever fixed at such wage
rate. The optimal strategy is characterized by a
unique reservation wage such that any offer above
such reservation level will be accepted, and
rejected otherwise.
Members of a two-agent household can be
in different states and are faced with different
options in each. First, both members may be
unemployed and choose to remain so. Alterna  -
tively, they can both accept their offers and stay
with the associated wages forever. The most
interesting case occurs when one member of the
household is currently employed and the other
is unemployed. The corresponding value func-
tions U (both unemployed), T (both employed),
and Ω (one employed and one unemployed) are
defined as follows: 
Since time is continuous, the probability of a
simultaneous arrival of offers when both agents
are unemployed is zero and is thus ignored in the
definition of U. Couples with only one employed
partner can do the following: The unemployed
partner accepts a job offer and, simultaneously,
the previously employed partner quits and starts
looking for new offers (the gain of the couple is
then Ω￿w2￿ – Ω￿w1￿). This “breadwinner cycle”
strategy is obviously not available to one-agent
households.
Results
If agents are risk neutral, the symmetry of the
model causes the couple to behave exactly as two
independent single agents. For a joint labor search
to make any difference agents must be risk averse.
Risk aversion causes an individual agent within
the couple to accept offers that a single-agent
household would reject because accepting an
offer does not prevent the couple from continuing
to search. Similarly, if one partner is working, the
unemployed member may reject offers that single
individuals would accept. A breadwinner cycle
does emerge in equilibrium. Partners alternate
between who works and who searches, depend-
ing on the offers received by each. When faced
with the same job offer sequence, single-agent
households simply accept a job and then never
quit. In the long run, the wages of both individu-
als in the two-agent household are higher under
joint search due to the breadwinner cycle.
The authors consider modifications to the
key model assumptions to understand the robust-
ness of their results. One interesting modification
allows employed agents to receive job offers (on-
the-job search). If the rate of arrival of offers is the
same for unemployed and employed individuals,
then the model with dual earners yields the same
solution as the single-agent case, even with risk-
rU u b w U dF w
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disappear if agents have access to risk-free borrow-
ing and lending and face “loose” debt constraints.
The basic intuition for this scenario is that bor-
rowing effectively substitutes for the consumption
smoothing provided within the two-agent house-
hold, making it irrelevant. Each partner can imple-
ment search strategies independent of the other
partner’s actions. Hence, they act again as in the
single-agent case.
In the next step of the analysis, the authors
extend the baseline model to study the problem
of choosing among multiple locations. For single
agents this extension is straightforward and only
requires adjusting reservation wages for the cost
of moving. In contrast, if the couple dislikes living
in different locations, then optimal choices may
be affected in important ways. First, if the cost of
living apart is paid period by period, it can easily
add up to more than the one-time relocation cost
paid by a single agent. Joint search thus adds new
frictions. Couples now face the following possible
states: (i) Both can be employed in the same
location (an absorbing state), or (ii) both can be
employed in different locations (assumed to be
another absorbing state). (iii) One partner can
be employed and the other unemployed, or (iv)
both can be unemployed and searching. Loca  tions
are assumed to be symmetric and thus partners
will live together if one is unemployed. Couples
must now account for inside and outside offers
in their value functions.
In this framework, and even under risk neu-
trality, two-agent households may behave differ-
ently from single-agent households. First, each
member of the two-agent household will be less
selective than a single-agent household—that is,
one individual of a couple will accept a wage offer
that the same individual would reject if single
because couples face a worse wage distribution
than single agents since some wage configurations
are only attainable living apart. Second, tied
stayers (a partner who rejects an offer he or she
would accept if single) and tied movers (a partner
who follows the other partner even when indi-
vidual calculations would dictate otherwise) can
easily emerge in equilibrium. Both possibilities
involve a high cost by each individual agent of a
couple compared with being single. However,
these choices are optimal from the perspective of
their household.
The authors then consider a set of simulations
to illustrate the quantitative implications of the
theory. They show there are reasonable parameter-
izations under which the joint-search problem
does yield results that are substantially different
(quantitatively) from an analysis based on single
agents. Specifically, if the cost of living apart is
relatively high, then the unemployment rate in a
two-agent job-search model can be as high as 13
percent versus 5 percent in the single-agent model
with an otherwise comparable parameterization.
Conclusion
It is conceivable that members of a two-agent
household make their job and location decisions
jointly. Standard models abstract from this. Guler,
Guvenen, and Violante develop a model in which
two-agent households pool income perfectly to
study the implications of this joint decision
process. They provide a thorough analysis of
conditions under which a couple’s behavior will
differ from that of both agents making choices
independently. Theory shows the insurance pro-
vided by a household partnership introduces the
possibility of a breadwinner cycle. If living apart
represents a flow cost for each member of the
couple, then this friction may cause individuals
to reject offers or to abandon jobs that they would
accept or keep, correspondingly, if single.
The analysis in this paper suggests important
issues, such as the design of unemployment com-
pensation or policies aimed at the participation
or attachment to the labor force, may be better
studied in a framework that explicitly models
joint decisions within a household.
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE 
DISPERSION AND RIGIDITY: 
A NEW MONETARIST APPROACH
Head, Liu, Menzio, and Wright study why
some sellers do not adjust their prices as soon 
as the aggregate price level changes. This “price
stickiness,” which appears to be a well-established
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modern monetary models. In particular, it allows
monetary policy to have real effects. The majority
of such models either assume prices are sticky or
impose an exogenous cost of changing prices.
Head et al. consider instead a framework in
which firms can always adjust their prices at no
cost. The model is a dynamic general equilibrium
monetary version of Burdett and Judd’s (1983)
model. There is a single good and a continuum
of identical consumers and firms. Firms post
prices and households take as given a price dis-
tribution. Households can sample only a finite
number of price offers.
The main message of this paper is that price
dispersion may emerge in equilibrium, even
without inflation. Monetary policy is neutral. Yet,
the theory can match key statistical properties
of prices in the U.S. data. The authors conclude
that the fact that prices are sticky, per se, does
not necessarily imply money is not neutral or
that particular policy recommendations must be
followed.
The Model
Time is discrete. As in Lagos and Wright
(2005), in every period two markets open sequen-
tially. The first is decentralized. Buyers and firms
come together through a frictional matching
process. Importantly, buyers are anonymous.
Hence, trade can only occur with fiat money,
which is supplied by the government. Households
face the following possibilities: With probability
a0 they cannot buy any good in this period; with
probability a1 they can buy from exactly one firm;
and with probability a2 they are able to buy from
two firms. Firms post prices. The household sees
the firms and posted prices, p, from which it is
possible to buy and must choose how much of
the good to purchase, qt. This household choice
is constrained by the amount of money carried
from the previous period, mt. The corresponding
value function is 














Here, W denotes the value function of entering
the second market (described below). The over-
all lifetime utility of households that enters this
market with mt units of money can then be writ-
ten as follows:
Notice that the lowest price charged by the two
firms is a random variable with distribution 
1 – [1 – Ft￿p￿]2.
Firms post a nominal price, taking as given a
buyer’s money holdings and the price distribution,
Ft￿p￿. The price to post and a production level
are then chosen to maximize expected profits.
The second market is centralized and money
or credit is allowed. Households work, purchase
goods, and, in doing so, determine how much
money they will have by the closing of this mar-
ket. The associated value function is
Here, xt denotes consumption, ht hours worked,
and wt hourly wages. Government transfers are
denoted as Tt and firms’ dividends Dt. A key
assumption of the model is that preferences are
quasilinear. This implies wealth effects wash out
and thus all households choose to carry the same
amount of money. The distribution of money is
therefore degenerate.
The paper ultimately focuses on stationary
monetary equilibrium whereby real money hold-
ings, consumption, and hours worked remain
constant, while prices grow at the same rate as
the money supply.
Results
Profit maximization implies (i) the price dis-
tribution is continuous and (ii) its support must
be an interval [p
–t,p –
t] (either mass points or gaps
in the support would allow an individual firm to
obtain a discrete increase in profits by adjusting
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customer base relatively constant). In equilibrium,
firms must be indifferent to posting any price on
the support of the distribution. Hence, more struc-
ture is needed to derive quantitative predictions.
Consider the set of firms whose prices lie on
the intersection of the new support for prices
(that results from monetary injections) and the
old support for prices. The authors assume that
at any given period a constant fraction ˁ of these
firms keeps their prices fixed, while the others
shift prices randomly. All firms whose prices do
not belong to the new support of the price distri-
bution shift to a random place in the new support.
Formally,
In the above equation, an asterisk denotes equi-
librium values; ˁ′ is sampled from a distribution
compatible with stationary equilibrium whereby
Ft+1￿p￿ = Ft *￿p/ﾵ￿. A nice feature of this pricing
policy is that when ˁ equals 1, the model attains
the smallest number of price changes and the
highest average price duration. When its value is
set to 0, firms change prices every period.
Not surprisingly, money is neutral in this
model because the overall distribution of prices
is perfectly flexible. However, money is not super-
neutral since inflation affects the nominal interest
rate and thus real money holdings.
The next step in the analysis considers a cali-
brated version of the model. A set of specific
parametric forms for costs, utility, and so on are
selected, as is standard in the literature. When
taking the model to the data, it is assumed that
the decentralized market corresponds to the U.S.
retail sector. Parameter values are chosen to match
the average real interest and inflation rates of the
U.S. data for 1988-2004. The empirical distribu-
tion of price changes of the retail sector and an
average markup of 30 percent are also calibration
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The authors then test the predictions of the
model regarding the effects of inflation on the
frequency and magnitude of price adjustments
and contrast them to their empirical counterparts.
Qualitatively speaking, the model is consistent
with the data. Quantitatively, the model slightly
overestimates the impact of inflation. The model
reasonably accounts for the fraction of positive
and negative price adjustments as inflation
changes.
Conclusion
Head et al. show that individual sellers may
optimally choose not to adjust prices as soon as
the aggregate price level changes even though it
is feasible and costless to do so because, in equi-
librium, expected profits are equal for all possible
prices a firm may post. The key friction is a mar-
ket with matching where buyers can sample only
a finite number of prices. Monetary policy is
neutral, yet the model accounts for price facts
very well. The key conclusion is that price sticki-
ness does not necessarily imply that money is
not neutral.
INTERGENERATIONAL 
REDISTRIBUTION IN THE 
GREAT RECESSION
If markets are incomplete, how does a nega-
tive productivity shock—a recession—affect the
welfare of young and old individuals? This is
the question investigated by Glover, Heathcote,
Krueger, and Rios-Rull. The key observation is
that households’ portfolios vary systematically
with age. In particular, older households hold a
larger fraction of their wealth in the form of assets
instead of human wealth (labor income). Consider
then a negative shock that affects both asset
returns and wages. This shock may induce older
households to sell some of their assets and, ulti-
mately, cause asset prices to fall more than wages.
In this case, the welfare of the old decreases by
more than that of the young. To see this, note that
the young lose part of their labor income but are
able to purchase assets at very low prices. Thus,
there is a mechanism that compensates them for
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nism that reduces the impact of the recession for
the old. Thus, if these forces are at work, we
expect that one of the effects of a recession is
redistribution of income from relatively old
households to relatively young ones.
The Model
Glover et al. use an overlapping-generations
model. They assume that preferences of a typical
individual are given by 
Individuals live for N periods (deterministic life-
time) and it is assumed that there are N cohorts
alive at any given time, each of identical size.
Labor is traded in spot markets and house-
holds can transfer wealth across periods by trad-
ing shares of the representative firm. The model
does not allow for capital accumulation.
Grover et al. study three versions of this econ-
omy distinguished by the portfolios that house-
holds are allowed to hold. The basic details are
as follows:
• Economy A: In this economy, households
can trade only shares in the risky firm.
There are no safe assets (e.g., bonds).
• Economy B: In this economy, households
can trade shares in the risky firm and a risk-
free bond. However, they cannot choose
their portfolio. It is exogenous and chosen
to match the evidence for the United States.
• Economy C: In this version, households
can trade both assets and they can choose
the composition of their portfolios. In this
economy, asset prices are endogenous.
Quantitative Results
Glover et al. calibrate the model using U.S.
data to get a sense of the quantitative effects of a
recession. The basic idea is to apply each version
(economies A-C) and pick all relevant parameters
to match the observed life-cycle profile of earn-
ings, net worth, and portfolio composition. The
calibrated version also matches the ratios of 












(i) aggregate safe assets to aggregate net worth
and (ii) aggregate net worth to aggregate (over a
10-year period) labor income. They assume that
a recession is given by a 10 percent drop in aggre-
gate productivity that lasts 10 years. Thus, the
model assumes that the expected duration of a
period of high productivity is 66.7 years and the
average duration of a recession is 11.8 years.
The nature of the experiment is to explore the
consequences of a transition from the aggregate
high-productivity shock to a low-productivity
shock. Since the three economies differ in terms
of access to financial instruments, it is useful to
report the results separately.
Economy A. For this version of the model,
Glover et al. find that the stock price falls 20
percent during a recession (a period of 10 years
in real time). In the post-recession period, stock
prices slightly overshoot their long-run values.
In terms of welfare, the consequences of a reces-
sion are monotonic in age: Older generations
suffer more. The actual magnitudes for the base-
line calibration amount to a 15 percent decline
in consumption. For the youngest households
this loss is just over 1 percent.
Economy B. In this economy, the decline in
asset prices is similar to that of Economy A and,
in general, asset prices move in the same direc-
tion. The price of bonds declines even more than
the price of stocks and the pattern of welfare
losses replicates that of the one-asset economy.
Economy C. In this economy, asset prices
decline by more than in the other two economies.
This reflects the fact that young households are
heavily leveraged (relative to the other economies)
and, hence, their wealth takes a larger hit. The
resulting decline in consumption by the younger
generations results in a larger decline in asset
prices. In this economy, the old hold more safe
assets than in the data and hence their welfare
does not suffer as much when the recession hits.
In terms of welfare—measured in consumption-
equivalent units—the oldest generation experi-
ences the largest decline (11.12 percent), although
a much smaller decline than in economies A
and B (around 14 to 15 percent). Moreover, the
youngest generation actually is slightly better
off since they can purchase assets at a much
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generations declines by more than in the other
two economies.
Conclusion
Glover et al. analyze the distributional con-
sequences of a large recession across different age
cohorts. The model is highly stylized but, across
different versions, a clear pattern emerges: The
oldest generation appears to suffer the most from
the recession since they must live the rest of
their lives in that state. The very young are the
least affected, as the majority of their lives will be
spent in high-productivity times and they also
benefit from the additional drop in asset prices
when they are net buyers.
Even though asset markets are complete in a
very narrow sense, there are no markets for inter-
generational risk-sharing. From the perspective
of a policymaker seeking to provide such insur-
ance, a policy of subsidizing the old by running
a deficit (issuing bonds) that will be paid off by
future generations appears as an interesting policy








mrohorog ˘lu and Kitao consider the quanti-
tative implications of three alternative Social
Security reforms: (i) a reduction in benefits and
payroll taxes, (ii) an increase in the earliest retire-
ment age (to 64 from 62), and (iii) an increase in
the normal retirement age (to 68 from 66). A key
motivation for this study is addressing the fore-
casted shortfall in the Social Security system.
(According to the “2009 OASDI Trustees Report”
of the Social Security Administration, either a
large reduction in benefits or an increase in taxes
may be required to prevent such a shortfall.) 
The framework of this analysis is a large-scale
overlapping-generations model with incomplete
insurance markets, endogenous savings, and a
social security system similar to that of the United
States. The model also includes health shocks,
which are known to have important implications
for precautionary savings and labor decisions. In
contrast to previous studies within this branch
of the literature, the model allows for endogenous
decisions in both benefit claiming and labor force
participation, which are at the core of the reforms
considered by the authors.
A carefully calibrated version of the model
suggests reforms (i) and (iii) (reducing benefits
and payroll taxes and increasing the normal retire-
ment age) have the largest impact. These reforms
make agents save and work more to obtain better
self-insurance, and the social security budget
improves significantly. Reform (ii) (increasing
the earliest retirement age) has a modest impact
since the savings obtained from early retirees are
compensated by higher expenditures at later ages.
The Model
The economy is populated by overlapping
generations of individuals who live up to J periods.
Their life span in uncertain. The population grows
at a constant rate. Each individual is subject to a
health status shock (driven by a Markov process
that depends on age). The probability of living
one more year is a function of the health status.
Individuals start with no assets. Each individual
has one unit of time per period that can be used
in market or leisure activities. Agents may save
in a risk-free asset but borrowing is not allowed.
There is an exogenously given age-specific pro-
ductivity profile that affects effective hours avail-
able for each activity. Agents face an idiosyncratic
labor productivity shock every period. Finally,
each individual is subject to idiosyncratic health
expenditure shocks, and the distribution of these
shocks depends on the health status of the indi-
vidual. Health expenditure shocks are partially
insured because of the presence of private health
insurance. Each agent may or may not have access
to private (employer-provided) health insurance.
Access is determined in the first period of life
and remains fixed into the infinite future. All of
the elderly have access to government-provided
health insurance (Medicare). Health insurance
programs pay a fraction of gross expenditures
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are such that health insurance programs are
actuarially fair.
The government operates a pay-as-you-go
pension system. The details of the system are
carefully constructed to mimic its U.S. counter-
part. Benefits are a concave function of lifetime
earnings, and benefits depend on whether the
agent chooses to retire early or late. Some taxes
are set to match the U.S. data counterparts. The
labor income tax rate is set to balance the govern-
ment budget.
Results
The model is calibrated to match data from
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS),
which includes self-reported health status and
medical expenditure data. Age-dependent labor
productivity is from Hansen (1993), while the
idiosyncratic component is based on the esti-
mates by Heathcote, Storeslettern, and Violante
(2008), whose aim is to match the observed U.S.
labor income inequality. The calibrated version
of the model matches the targeted U.S. data well.
This suggests that the model may be a reason-
able instrument to perform quantitative counter-
factual experiments (and to derive the possible
implications of the proposed reforms to Social
Security).
The first quantitative experiment assumes
the social security tax and benefits are simultane-
ously reduced by 50 percent. The precautionary
motif causes a very strong increase in savings
such that aggregate capital increases by 10 per-
cent. For instance, savings by retirement age
increase by 18.8 percent. The total labor income
tax declines, and thus the labor supply increases
by about 3 percent. Higher wages and hours
worked ultimately translate to a Social Security
budget surplus of about 0.3 percent of GDP.
The second policy considered by the authors,
which raises the earliest retirement age by two
years, has small implications on aggregate macro
variables. Furthermore, despite the government
savings from not paying benefits to individuals
62 and 63 years of age, their benefits at a later age
are also higher and offset savings.
The final experiment, which increases the
normal retirement age by two years, has impor-
tant quantitative implications. Old-age partici-
pation increases, more individuals postpone
claiming their benefits and, as a result, the Social
Security deficit becomes a surplus of 1.32 percent
of GDP. The aggregate capital stock and assets at
retirement age increase modestly (2.4 percent
and 5.5 percent), relative to the first policy reform.
The last part of the paper evaluates the impli-
cations of some modifications to the theoretical
framework. One extension of considerable interest
introduces forecasted changes in demographic
structure into the model (the benchmark experi-
ment takes the current demographic structure as
given into the infinite future). Of course, this
results in an even more serious deficit for the
system absent any reform. The first and last policy
reforms have quantitatively similar implications,





mrohorog ˘lu and Kitao study the quantitative
implications of three different proposals to reform
(and improve the budget of) the Social Security
system. This is done within a framework of a
very detailed social security system that mimics
the main features of the U.S. system. Either a
reduction in benefits and payroll taxes or an
increase in the normal retirement age will create
a system surplus. In the first case, this occurs
because of large increases in precautionary sav-
ings and hours worked. In the second case, it is
due to the higher old-age labor participation and
a modest increase in savings. Increasing the ear-
liest retirement age, in contrast, results in current
savings that are essentially canceled by later (and
higher) benefit claims and thus has negligible
effects on the Social Security budget.
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